Monday, 18 August 2025

Purview and the Rebranding of Authority

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 71, 84):

To describe these nuances, we will consider them in terms of who has purview over the meanings being tendered. By this we refer to who if anyone in the conversation is interpersonally tied to the message being put forward or wedded to its outcome. There can be speaker purview, in which case the speaker is wedded to what they are putting forward, or no speaker purview, in which case they are not. At the same time, there can be listener purview, where the speaker is handing control of the meanings over to the listener, or no speaker purview, where they are not .⁸

⁸ This is generalised across Zhang’s (2021) discussion of speaker and listener positioning in terms of who ‘knows’ the information being discussed and relates closely to what Zhang (2020c) calls the ‘spatial’ dimension of conversation. Here, the ‘spatial’ dimension refers to the expansion or contraction of the dialogic space (in relation to ENGAGEMENT in appraisal (Martin & White, 2005; White, 2003)), in terms of allowance for other voices. Zhang’s temporal dimension, concerned with whether the expansion or contraction of the dialogic space is looking prospectively to what will be said next (typically the next move by another speaker), or retrospectively to what has been said previously, impinges on our tender/render distinction. Rendering typically works in dialogue retrospectively (though as we have seen in relation to engagement, this is not always the case), while the variation in marking purview being discussed here, typically occurs prospectively (though once again, with room for variation in relation to engagement, as we will discuss below). Zhang’s work provides a crucial link between the dialogic exchange in conversation and the dialogism that occurs in the play of voices (i.e. between NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL) that this and the previous chapter seeks to model. Indeed his work also suggests that options in purview might best be considered as a cline of more or less speaker/listener purview, rather than a binary choice, though we do not have scope to explore this here. Within conversation analysis, this area of meaning relates to what (Heritage & Raymond, 2005) discuss in terms of epistemic authority.


ChatGPT Comments:

This excerpt is rich for critique, especially given the authors’ own admission in the endnote that purview is essentially a rebranding of epistemic authority, and that they are locating it in context rather than in the language itself. Here are the main points worth highlighting:


1. Contextual vs. linguistic focus

  • By locating purview in context (“who is interpersonally tied to the message,” “who has control over meanings”), the authors shift the analytic locus away from observable linguistic resources.

  • This approach imports a cognitive-intentional framing, because purview is construed as an attribute of speakers’ or listeners’ “tie” to a message or “wedding” to an outcome. This departs from SFL’s canonical treatment, which would track how lexicogrammar and semantics realise interpersonal effects, rather than presuming them.


2. Normative and binary assumptions

  • The distinction between “speaker purview” and “listener purview” (or no purview) risks oversimplification. Even in the endnote, the authors gesture at a cline but do not operationalise it. The binary framing can obscure the subtle gradations in how agency and authority are negotiated in conversation.

  • Terms like “wedded to” or “handing control” carry normative weight: they suggest attachment, obligation, or responsibility, which are not strictly semiotic categories but social–psychological interpretations.


3. Reliance on external theoretical frameworks

  • The excerpt draws heavily on Zhang (2020, 2021) and Heritage & Raymond (2005), linking purview to dialogic space, engagement, and epistemic authority. While this situates the concept historically, it also imports mixed theoretical logics: appraisal, conversation analysis, and the authors’ own rebranding. This can dilute analytic clarity, making it unclear whether purview is a linguistic phenomenon, a contextual attribute, or a theoretical lens.


4. Implications for analytic claims

  • Treating purview as contextually located means the unit of analysis is inferred relationships or knowledge states, not the semiotic moves themselves. This raises a methodological problem: claims about “speaker weddedness” or “listener control” cannot be verified in the text alone; they rely on the analyst’s interpretation of the context.

  • The admission that purview is a rebranding of epistemic authority underscores this: it is essentially a conceptual overlay, rather than a novel systemic mechanism observable in language.


In short:
Purview, as presented, is less a descriptive system of linguistic or semiotic resources than a contextual framing of epistemic authority, tied to assumptions about speaker and listener stance. Its weakness lies in importing cognitive, normative, and contextual assumptions that are not empirically grounded in the lexicogrammar itself.


The authors present purview as a way of mapping who “has control” over meanings in conversation — who is “wedded” to a message and who can tender it to others. While framed as a neutral descriptive tool, purview is explicitly located in context rather than language, and the endnote admits it is essentially a rebranding of epistemic authority from conversation analysis. This means the analytic focus shifts from observable semiotic resources to inferred relational and cognitive states, importing assumptions about attachment, control, and responsibility. The binary framing of speaker/listener purview, even when softened by a suggested cline, risks oversimplifying the gradations of authority and engagement in dialogue. In short, purview functions more as a conceptual overlay linking dialogue to epistemic power than as a linguistically grounded system, trading systemic description for interpretive inference.

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