Hidden Constellations or Negotiable Meanings?

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 87):

Exploring axiological constellations is thus vital for understanding how people affiliate in communities, understand the world around them, maintain solidarity and distance themselves from 'outsiders'. But by their very nature, such constellations are often implicit and rarely discussed in detail. The result is that they often only surface when someone goes against the order of things – whether this be someone new to the community who does not know the way things are, someone with a different constellation that leads to a clash, or whether it be someone aiming to challenge the constellation, either through iconoclastic ruptures or through gradual progressive adjustment.

 

ChatGPT Comments:

The authors conflate what is implicit in social practice with what is implicit in language. In SFL, interpersonal meanings are always negotiable and observable in the patterns of engagement, appraisal, and projection — they do not “surface” only through exceptional breaches. By adopting the LCT framing, the narrative risks overstating the rarity and opacity of the background meanings that SFL would model as ordinary, ongoing construals.

Predetermined Stance or Probabilistic Meaning?

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 87):

As (Maton, 2014, p. 158) explains, tightly bound constellations in a community delimit the possible combinations of stances available to people by orienting options as necessarily associated or opposed. This means if someone aligns with one position in a constellation, it will likely be taken to mean they also align with others – regardless of whether they state this explicitly. Maton (2014) illustrates this by mapping the axiological constellation in education that opposes so-called ‘student centred learning environments’ with ‘teacher centred learning environments’.

 

ChatGPT Comments:

Here, the authors present axiological constellations as deterministic: one stance implies alignment with a set of others. The SFL import of this idea is underdeveloped. In canonical SFL, alignment between stances is probabilistic and realised through interpersonal meaning-making (engagement, appraisal, modality) rather than presupposed by an abstract sociological constellation. By taking Maton’s sociological claim at face value, the model risks attributing structural constraints to meaning where, from a Hallidayan perspective, only negotiation and interactional patterns exist. There is an assumption that these constellations exist independently and are merely “mapped” by SFL analysis.

Rebranding Appraisal: From Interpersonal Meaning to Axiological Constellations

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 87):

These questions directly implicate SFL’s long-standing dialogue with the sociological framework of Legitimation Code Theory (LCT, Maton 2014). LCT conceptualises communities and social fields of practice as being organised through more-or-less tightly bound sets of positions called constellations of meaning. … The most important type of constellation for this chapter is that which centres on emotional, aesthetic, ethical, moral and political stances, which LCT calls axiological constellations.

 

ChatGPT Comments:

This is the hinge where the chapter pivots from a loose, commonsense notion of “values” into a technical construct imported from sociology. The shift is subtle but decisive. “Values” are no longer treated as interpersonal meanings that can be modelled within SFL’s own semantics (e.g. appraisal). Instead, they are redescribed in LCT’s terms as “axiological constellations,” and SFL is tasked with mapping these constellations in text.

Two consequences follow. First, the boundary between context (social formations such as “constellations”) and semantics (the linguistic resources that construe them) begins to blur. What SFL traditionally models as context variables are here confused with semantic resources, flattening the stratal distinction that Halliday treated as foundational. Second, SFL categories are placed in a secondary, supportive role — tools for illustrating concepts defined externally in LCT. This creates the impression of synthesis, but the movement is actually rebranding: re-describing familiar SFL phenomena in imported terminology rather than developing SFL’s categories on their own terms.

More succinctly…

In this section, the chapter pivots decisively from the diffuse notion of “values” toward a more technical apparatus imported from sociology: LCT’s axiological constellations. Suddenly, what were previously interpersonal meanings within SFL are redescribed as elements of social formations, and SFL’s own categories are tasked with illustrating externally defined structures. The effect is subtle but profound: context and semantics begin to blur, and familiar appraisal resources are repositioned as secondary, supportive tools. The result is not synthesis, but a strategic rebranding, one that reframes longstanding SFL phenomena in borrowed terminology.

Addendum: On “Axiological” vs “Attitudinal”

There is an additional problem lurking in the terminology itself. The phrase “axiological constellation” is presented by Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025) as if it were a natural extension of work on evaluative language. Yet the word axiology has a specific history: it refers to the study of the grounds of value — the philosophical bases for aesthetic, ethical, moral, or evaluative judgments.

In this chapter, however, axiological is not used in this traditional sense. Instead, it is effectively treated as a synonym for attitudinal: a constellation of positive or negative assessments clustered around some social object (for example, the set of evaluations associated with MAGA). What are redescribed as “axiological constellations” are, in SFL terms, simply networks of attitudes.

Two consequences follow:

1. Terminological drift — A philosophical term is repurposed to mean something far narrower, with the effect that “axiological” and “attitudinal” collapse into one another. This substitution does not extend SFL, but instead muddies the distinction between the bases of evaluation and the evaluations themselves.

2. Theoretical rebranding — By redescribing SFL’s attitudinal meanings as “axiological constellations,” the authors create the appearance of innovation while in fact re-labelling familiar Appraisal resources in imported terms. This is not cumulative theory-building but terminological sleight of hand.

In short, the very label that anchors Chapter 4 is compromised. Far from clarifying the relation between SFL and LCT, the use of axiological constellation introduces both a conceptual confusion and a disciplinary misrepresentation.

From Tiny Feelings to Cultural Forces: How Interpersonal Resources Get Rebranded

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 85):

When we talk to each other we do so upon a vast background of shared values. These may be culture-wide values that are deeply held and rarely questioned, they may be more explicit values constantly up for contestation or they may be very personal feelings known only to a few. These values may govern the shape of our lives and lead us to take arms against a sea of troubles, or they may simply be small, liminal, and seemingly inconsequential feelings that help us sort out our day-to-day lives and commune with the people we know. Nonetheless, throughout our social life, these values guide our decisions and the ways we talk; they allow us to affiliate with people, build solidarity, and help us sort out the world as we navigate a passage through it.

ChatGPT Comments:

This opening is mostly scene-setting rhetoric. It’s broad, sweeping, and couched in accessible language — designed to sound resonant rather than precise. From a critical perspective, here’s what’s worth noting:

1. Conceptual imprecision

   • “Values” here are treated as a kind of universal background substance, shaping everything from “solidarity” to “sorting out our day-to-day lives.” But there’s no differentiation between institutionalised norms, axiological stances, and everyday affective dispositions.

   • By treating all of these as instances of “values,” they are already smoothing over distinctions that SFL normally maintains — e.g. attitude vs ideology, interpersonal vs cultural.

2. Slippage into psychological idiom

   • The phrasing “personal feelings known only to a few” drifts toward individual psychology, rather than maintaining a social-semiotic focus. This pulls against the systemic-functional principle that meanings are always construed through semiotic resources.

3. The seed of the rebranding

   • By positing “values” as the shared background that guides decisions and allows affiliation, the authors are positioning values as primary organising forces. This sets up the rest of the chapter to re-describe SFL’s interpersonal resources as the machinery for building and negotiating these values.

   • That manoeuvre already risks conflating value systems (social or cultural) with semiotic systems (linguistic resources).

👉 Verdict: There’s not much to contest here in detail — it’s more atmospheric than analytical. But it is strategically important, because it frames “values” as the natural background substance of discourse, preparing the ground for the subsequent system of ORIENTING to be presented as a way of mapping how values “hang together.”

Diagnostic Critique of Chapter 3

ChatGPT Comments:

1. Conflation of system and instance.

Throughout the chapter, the authors oscillate between describing systems of meaning (tendering, rendering, positioning) and describing interactional practices (how people negotiate, layer, reposition). These are repeatedly collapsed into one another, leaving unclear whether the “system of POSITIONING” is proposed as an abstract, paradigmatic system or a descriptive account of conversational behaviour. This weakens theoretical rigour, as systems and instances require different orders of abstraction.

2. Inconsistent modelling of system relations.

The representation of tendering and rendering as both disjunctive and conjunctive (Figure 3.3) exemplifies a lack of modelling precision. The same categories are at times mutually exclusive, at times co-instantiable, without theoretical justification for the dual relation. The ambiguity undermines the explanatory power of the system network and makes it unstable as a representation of paradigmatic options.

3. Ambiguity in layering and planes of negotiation.

The notion of layering — simultaneous tendering and rendering, internal vs. external negotiation — is presented as central to the model. However, the account remains descriptive rather than systemic. The resources for layering are not modelled paradigmatically, but instead gestured to narratively. This produces a vocabulary of interesting interactional phenomena, but not a systematised account of how these options interrelate.

4. Unstable treatment of text as object vs. semiosis.

In discussing “internal negotiation,” the authors position text both as “a thing in itself” and as “semiosis about something else.” This binary creates unnecessary theoretical turbulence, since in a stratified model text is always simultaneously semiotic event and semiotic object, depending on the perspective of construal. The attempt to posit a second “plane” of negotiation recycles existing metafunctional distinctions without properly situating them.

5. Rhetorical recourse to everyday intuitions.

The chapter repeatedly falls back on conversational common sense (“whenever we talk, we negotiate our social relations”) as if this everyday grounding lends theoretical authority. While pedagogically useful, such recourse risks diluting the analytic model into paraphrase of the obvious, rather than consolidating it as a precise account of meaning-making.

---

Overall Diagnostic

Chapter 3 sets out to formalise a system of POSITIONING but ultimately produces a hybrid discourse that oscillates between systemic categories, descriptive narratives of talk, and evaluative accounts of values and ideology. The central problems are (i) repeated conflations of distinct semiotic orders (system/instance, meaning/value, tenor/context), and (ii) instability in systemic modelling (disjunctive vs. conjunctive categories, descriptive vs. paradigmatic layering). The cumulative effect is to undermine the chapter’s claim to present a coherent “system” of positioning: what emerges instead is a shifting patchwork of overlapping intuitions, diagrams, and metaphors, which lack integration within the Hallidayan architecture they purport to extend.

Dialogue, Positions, and the Promise of "Deep" Values

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 83):

In the next chapter we extend our exploration of interpersonal meanings by considering how different positions can be connected to one another in dialogue and monologue. In particular, we will explore how these connections support the development of integrated sets of values – both those that are ephemeral (that are needed for only a particular situation at a particular point in time) and those that are deep and long-standing (that organise the way we see and engage with the world). By taking this step, we will not simply gain insight into how we negotiate social relations, but also into what the meanings are that underpin these social relations.

ChatGPT Comments

1. From negotiation to values: a category mistake

The transition from modelling interpersonal positioning to theorising values conflates two distinct dimensions of social organisation:

• Tenor realised by interpersonal meaning → how social relations are negotiated.

• Value systems → institutional, cultural, and biological infrastructures that orient practices and judgements.

2. Ephemeral vs. deep values

The distinction between “ephemeral” (situation-specific) and “deep and long-standing” values is not grounded in the systemic architecture of SFL. Instead, it imports a sociological/psychological register of “values” that sits awkwardly with the semantics of appraisal. What counts as ephemeral meaning in SFL terms would usually be explained by instantiation (a temporary patterning of system), not by positing a special category of “ephemeral values.”

3. “Integrated sets of values” as overreach

The promise to show how dialogue connects positions into “integrated sets of values” suggests that interpersonal negotiation builds social ontology directly. This collapses the distinction between construal (meaning as symbolic alignment) and coordination (value-laden social practices). Without maintaining this distinction, their model risks suggesting that every micro-interaction is already the formation of a cultural value system — a claim that is both theoretically unsound and empirically untenable.

4. Theoretical drift under cover of expansion

This concluding gesture epitomises the drift of the chapter:

• Starting with interpersonal negotiation,

• Expanding to a broad umbrella system (POSITIONING),

• Sliding into the terrain of values and cultural organisation.

At each step, a new term is layered on top, but instead of clarifying strata and systems, the expansion collapses them into a single continuum of “negotiation → value → underpinning.” The effect is a grand rhetorical flourish that disguises theoretical incoherence.

POSITIONING and Orchestration: When Terminology Outpaces Systemic Precision

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 83):

Social relations are intricate – we negotiate our status and our solidarity all the time and in multiple ways at once. The system of POSITIONING we have established in Chapters 2 and 3 captures the basic set of resources we use to do this negotiation. Throughout, we have tried to capture both the inter of the interpersonal (in terms of how we establish turn-taking and dialogue and how we position others in relation to ourselves) and the personal of the interpersonal (in order to understanding how we express ourselves and share our feelings). By bringing these perspectives together we can better understand the orchestration of interpersonal meaning that unfolds through spoken and written texts.

ChatGPT Comments:

1. Redundancy disguised as innovation

The claim that social relations are intricate and negotiated “all the time and in multiple ways at once” is a truism. What follows is not the establishment of new resources but a re-labelling of already-theorised interpersonal systems (mood, modality, appraisal, turn-taking). The introduction of POSITIONING as a unifying system risks being less a theoretical advance than a terminological umbrella.

2. The system of POSITIONING: systemic or descriptive?

While framed as a system, it remains unclear what the paradigmatic options are, how delicacy is organised, or how choices are instantiated in text. In Hallidayan terms, a system is defined by explicit choices with probabilities of occurrence. Here, POSITIONING functions instead as a broad metaphor for interpersonal negotiation, lacking the systemic rigour it claims.

3. The “inter of the interpersonal” vs. “personal of the interpersonal”

This dichotomy is rhetorically appealing but theoretically imprecise. The “inter” is said to concern dialogue and turn-taking; the “personal” concerns expressing self and feelings. Yet these map loosely onto established categories: dialogue management → exchange structure; expression of affect → appraisal. The binary adds poetic flourish but no additional explanatory power, and risks obscuring the fact that these are not two perspectives on the same metafunctional plane but distinct sets of semantic resources already modelled.

4. Misrepresentation of appraisal’s scope

By assigning the “personal of the interpersonal” to POSITIONING, the authors obscure appraisal’s central role in handling affect, judgement, and appreciation — all of which are already designed to theorise “how we express ourselves and share our feelings.” Instead of extending appraisal theory, they overwrite it with new branding.

5. “Orchestration” as vague unifier

The term “orchestration” promises an integrated view of interpersonal meaning but is never pinned down analytically. In canonical SFL, orchestration across strata is already modelled: systems operate simultaneously, with realisation across strata accounting for their alignment in text. Without a technical definition, “orchestration” becomes a rhetorical gesture toward wholeness, rather than a contribution to systemic modelling.

6. Collapse of contextual and semantic levels

The excerpt slips between “social relations” (contextual tenor), “turn-taking and dialogue” (discourse semantics), and “sharing our feelings” (appraisal systems). By subsuming all of these under POSITIONING, the stratified model of SFL is flattened. Instead of clarifying how tenor is realised by semantics, the analysis conflates strata into a single bundle of interpersonal negotiation.

7. Net effect: theoretical opacity through rhetorical polish

The passage’s surface coherence — balancing inter/personal, status/solidarity, orchestration — masks theoretical imprecision. By introducing POSITIONING as an overarching system, the authors risk generating an all-encompassing but analytically shallow category, one that obscures the finer systemic distinctions on which SFL’s explanatory power depends. 

Layering, Repositioning, and Rendering: When Jargon Outpaces Theory

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 82-3):

This negotiation is enabled not simply through the different ways in which we can tender and render positions, but also the possibility of layering these meanings. In the previous chapter we explored that people may tender and render meanings at the same time, reacting to something that has happened (or may happen) while putting something else forward to be negotiated. We saw that this was a key resource for extending conversation indefinitely, and in doing so, we offered a view on chat from the perspective of tenor. In addition, we saw that when engaging with meanings through rendering or nuancing meanings through purview, we can do so for the propositions or proposals being discussed (external negotiation), or we can alternatively do so for the speech acts themselves (internal negotiation) – in the latter case commenting on how language itself is being used. This allows for a second plane of discussion that takes the reality of text as a thing in itself, rather than just semiosis about something else. Finally, we saw all of these resources could be repositioned, with one position standing for another. This offers a third avenue through which people may negotiate their social relations along multiple lines.

ChatGPT Comments:

1. Terminological inflation: “layering” without systemic specification

The authors introduce layering as an enabling resource for negotiation but do not specify its systemic status. Is layering a distinct system, a metafunctional overlap, or simply the simultaneity of meanings across strata? Without clarification, the term risks functioning as descriptive rhetoric rather than theoretical category, duplicating what Halliday already models through rankshift, embedding, and metafunctional interplay.

2. The simultaneity of tendering and rendering

The claim that meanings can be tendered and rendered “at the same time” simply restates the well-established principle that interpersonal moves are often co-instantiated (e.g. offering while qualifying, demanding while conceding). Systemic functional linguistics has long accounted for this simultaneity through mood and modality working in tandem with appraisal. By presenting simultaneity as a new discovery, the model obscures rather than extends the canonical framework.

3. “Indefinite extension of conversation” as explanatory overreach

The assertion that layering is a key resource for extending conversation indefinitely is overstated. Conversation can continue due to a wide range of discourse-semantic resources — topic management, cohesive chaining, politeness, repair — not merely because tendering and rendering can be layered. The explanation risks narrowing a complex phenomenon to the rebranded categories the authors have introduced.

4. The tenor framing of “chat”

Positioning this as a “view on chat from the perspective of tenor” misapplies SFL’s stratification: tenor is a contextual variable realised by semantics, not a discourse-semantic system in itself. The analysis thereby collapses levels, treating tenor as if it were directly constituted by conversational strategies, rather than mediated by semantic systems.

5. External vs internal negotiation: duplication of appraisal resources

The external/internal distinction (propositions/proposals vs. speech acts themselves) echoes the canonical contrast between engaging with experiential content and engaging with dialogic positioning (e.g. heteroglossic resources for acknowledging or contesting speech acts). By rebranding this as internal vs external negotiation, the authors obscure existing appraisal theory while introducing redundant terminology.

6. Text as object vs text as semiosis

The claim that internal negotiation opens a “second plane of discussion” in which the reality of text as a thing in itself is taken up conflates reflexivity with stratification. Reflexive commentary on language is already theorised in SFL through projection, modality, and appraisal (particularly metadiscourse and attribution). Invoking a new “plane” suggests ontological novelty where there is in fact an already-mapped systemic pathway.

7. Repositioning and substitution: vague but familiar

Finally, the claim that resources can be repositioned, with one position standing for another is not unpacked theoretically. If this refers to metaphor (e.g. mood metaphor, interpersonal metaphor), it is already central in SFL. If it refers to substitution of one stance for another, then appraisal covers this territory. Without clear mapping, “repositioning” risks being a catch-all label rather than a defined system.

8. General tendency toward rhetorical accumulation

Across the passage, a pattern emerges: new terminology (layering, internal/external negotiation, repositioning) is piled onto the tendering/rendering model, but without showing clear systemic relations or offering criteria for delimiting one resource from another. The effect is rhetorical accumulation rather than theoretical integration. 

Tendering Nuance, Flattening Complexity: Innovation or Illusion in Interpersonal Meaning?

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 82):

Whenever we talk to each other, we negotiate our social relations. We put forward meanings and we react to those that have been put forward. We present meanings in a way that suggests they may or may not be shared and we engage with them in more or less sympathetic ways. In Chapters 2 and 3 we have presented a model of resources for how we put forward and react to these meanings. We first stepped through the system of rendering to show the different ways we can engage with meanings that have been tendered or implicated in a text. Then in this chapter, we explored how people can put forward meanings in nuanced ways that acknowledge the positions of those around them. Together these resources allow for the intricate negotiation of social relations that all of us engage in everyday.

ChatGPT Comments:

1. Conflation of negotiation with all talk

The opening claim — “Whenever we talk to each other, we negotiate our social relations” — generalises negotiation to all instances of dialogue. While interpersonal meanings are indeed always at stake in interaction, negotiation (in the Hallidayan sense) is a specific semantic process of exchanging roles and values. By universalising negotiation, the authors risk blurring the crucial distinction between the omnipresence of interpersonal meaning and the specific resources by which exchange and alignment are enacted.

2. The “put forward / react” binary

The model is framed around a reductive dyad: putting forward vs reacting. This foregrounds a mechanical push-and-pull exchange structure, reminiscent of speech function theory, but ignores the range of simultaneous interpersonal meanings realised in dialogue: stance, alignment, modality, affect, judgement, graduation, etc. By collapsing all interpersonal work into this binary, the model oversimplifies the semiotic resources available for interpersonal meaning-making.

3. Rendering as engagement with tendered meanings

The authors describe “rendering” as the set of resources for engaging with meanings that have been tendered or implicated in a text. This creates two theoretical difficulties:

• Circularity: “rendering” is defined only in relation to “tendering,” which itself is not clearly theorised beyond “putting forward.”

• Conflation of strata: “implicated meanings” reach into discourse semantics and intertextual inference, yet are folded into a system as context. This risks treating distinct phenomena as one, without specifying the systemic relations that differentiate them.

4. Affective alignment disguised as nuance

The claim that people put forward meanings in nuanced ways that acknowledge the positions of those around them conflates evaluative stance with exchange roles. In SFL, such “acknowledgement” is modelled through appraisal resources (e.g. heteroglossic engagement, attribution, concession) rather than through speech functions. By folding evaluative alignment into a tendering system, the model displaces appraisal from its place in the semantic architecture and risks duplicating it under new terminology.

5. Overstating integration

The authors conclude that together these resources allow for the intricate negotiation of social relations that all of us engage in everyday. This overstates the explanatory scope of the proposed “rendering/tendering” framework. The canonical SFL model already accounts for this through mood, modality, appraisal, and speech function. The new terminology does not so much integrate resources as re-package them, producing an illusion of explanatory novelty without clarifying their interrelations. 

The POSITIONING System Network

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 81-2):

Figure 3.3 brings together the options for rendering built in the previous chapter with those of tendering in this chapter to show the full system of POSITIONING.

ChatGPT Comments:

 Here are some theoretical tensions and confusions in this model that stand out:

1. Heterogeneous criteria of system delicacy
The network presents “POSITIONING” as a unified system, yet the delicacy expansions combine very different dimensions of meaning. The initial branching (render vs tender) sets up the primary contrast, but subsequent sub-systems shift criteria inconsistently:

• address vs note concerns interpersonal orientation versus commentary,

• placement (external vs internal) invokes discourse-structural positioning,

• proposition vs proposal introduces metafunctional clause type,

• open vs complete invokes structural polarity,

• purview introduces epistemic stance.
  What is presented as systemic delicacy is in fact a heterogeneous aggregation of distinctions that originate in different metafunctions and strata.

2. The tendering/rendering ambiguity
The diagram signals both a disjunctive and a conjunctive relationship between render and tender. This produces a conceptual inconsistency: are rendering and tendering mutually exclusive choices, or are they simultaneous dimensions of meaning? The attempt to code both at once collapses two theoretically distinct relations:

• paradigmatic opposition (choosing one or the other), and

• simultaneous activation (both may apply to a single instance).
  In practice, rendering and tendering often co-occur (e.g. “I think you’re wrong” both evaluates an existing stance and advances a counter-claim). The network’s simultaneous disjunctive/conjunctive representation fails to clarify how these dimensions intersect, instead producing analytical indeterminacy.

3. The purview problem
The addition of speaker purview versus listener purview exemplifies the model’s attempt to taxonomise epistemic stance as if it were a structural variable of the same order as mood or polarity. The resulting options (share, assert, pose, air) artificially discretise what is in practice a gradient of interpersonal alignment. More significantly, this construct duplicates resources already modelled in SFL (mood, modality, projection) without clarifying how these interact, leading to redundancy rather than theoretical integration.

4. Systemic incoherence
Although each sub-system is presented as if of the same systemic order (“rendering,” “placement,” “completion,” “purview”), they draw from divergent theoretical bases:

• speech function (proposition vs proposal),

• stance (support vs reject),

• logical completion (open vs complete),

• epistemicity (purview).
  The overall appearance of comprehensiveness masks the fact that the network is a collage of heterogeneous categories. The combination of inconsistent logics undermines systemic coherence.

5. Terminological inflation
By gathering these distinctions under the heading “POSITIONING,” the model creates the impression of a novel interpersonal system. Yet all the included options correspond to resources already theorised within canonical SFL: speech function, mood, modality, appraisal, and thematic organisation. The rebranding substitutes terminological novelty for theoretical clarity, risking obfuscation rather than refinement of the interpersonal system.

Tendering Confusions: Duplicating Semantics at the Context Plane

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 80-1):

With this discussion of purview, we have completed the set of options for the system of POSITIONING. Leaving aside repositioning, Figure 3.2 brings together the network of TENDERING established in this chapter. This network says that when tendering, one may tender a proposition or a proposal and that this proposition or proposal may be open or complete, may have speaker purview or not, and may have listener purview or not.

ChatGPT Comments:

In Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 80–1), the authors present Figure 3.2 as a system network for tendering, summarising the options discussed throughout the chapter. The network is described as showing that a proposition or proposal may be open or complete, may have speaker purview or not, and may have listener purview or not. At first glance, this seems like a tidy synthesis of the chapter’s material. However, closer scrutiny reveals a number of theoretical and conceptual issues.

Duplicating semantic categories at the context plane

The first issue is that the network seems to duplicate categories that properly belong to the content plane—specifically, the semantics of SPEECH FUNCTION—at the level of context. Speaker and listener purview are treated as options in tenor, that is, the context plane, yet many of the distinctions the authors draw (e.g., complete vs open propositions, hedged vs asserted modalities) are realised in the semantics and grammar of the content plane. By elevating these distinctions to context, the network conflates the strata: the same semantic distinctions are effectively represented twice, once as grammatical/semantic realisations, and again as contextual “purview” options.

Ambiguity of ‘tendering’ as a system label

The term tendering itself is also problematic. Its scope and status within the network are unclear: is it meant to denote the act of proposing a proposition/proposal generally, or a particular mode of interpersonal negotiation in discourse? The authors do not explicitly distinguish between these readings, leaving the reader to infer whether tendering is an operational category, a functional label, or a meta-concept. This undercuts the explanatory power of the network and makes it difficult to see how it could be applied consistently.

Overextension of the network logic

Finally, by combining all options (open/complete, speaker/listener purview) in a single system network, the authors risk suggesting that these are discrete, combinable choices in every instance. In practice, however, many of these options are mutually constraining: open propositions are typically associated with lower speaker purview, for example. Treating them as fully independent variables, as the network implies, flattens the nuanced interplay of internal and external purview discussed earlier in the chapter.

Conclusion

While the network provides a visually compact summary of the chapter, it does so at the cost of theoretical clarity. It conflates semantic realisations with contextual options, obscures the status of the tendering category, and overstates the independence of different purview options. In short, it presents a tidy system that may look neat on paper but does little to illuminate the complex, stratified nature of interpersonal meaning in context.

Purview Overreach: Duplicating Contextual Categories in English

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 80):

Purview can be more or less grammaticalised across languages. In English, as we have seen, it’s realisation is distributed across a range of interpersonal grammatical systems. But as (Bartlett, 2021) notes, Scottish Gaelic makes a primary distinction within indicative clauses which parallels to an extent how we have described speaker purview in both monologue and dialogue. Bartlett notes that within indicatives, rather than having a distinction between interrogatives and declaratives, Scottish Gaelic makes a distinction between [assertive] and [non-assertive] clauses – which is realised through distinct verb forms and the use of mood clitics. The non-assertive choice ‘render[s] propositions open to alternatives, whether this be through questioning, attributing or entertaining other possibilities. In contrast, independent forms without mood clitics [i.e. assertive choices] realise the monogloss semantics of unmodalised K1 moves and of K2 moves eliciting specific details in an uncontested propositions.’ (Bartlett 2021: 276). (Wang, 2021) describes a similar choice for Mandarin Chinese between what he calls [pose] and [tender], which is simultaneous with indicative and imperative – where ‘[pose] indicates that we table a proposition or proposal for assessment, opening up the dialogic space and [tender] on the other hand means that we proffer the proposition or proposal as non-negotiable’. In this regard, as we have noted above, it was Zhang’s (2020a, b, c, 2021) rich description of Khorchin Mongolian in this area that was a primary influence on our work here. See also the description of STANCE in Korean by (Kim, Martin, Shin, & Choi, 2023). They in effect propose that informal Korean negotiates propositions and proposals through options in a system grammaticalising purview, in contrast to formal Korean which negotiates through MOOD (i.e., declarative, interrogative, imperative) options (see also (Martin & Cruz, 2021) on ASSESSMENT systems in Tagalog). Work of this kind indicates that the interpersonal grammar of languages needs to be re/interpreted from a top-down perspective, beginning with something like the range of tenor options proposed in this volume. Otherwise it runs the risk of being trapped by an 'Anglocentric' perspective which foregrounds declarative, interrogative and imperative as basic interpersonal options.

ChatGPT Comments:

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 80) continue their exposition of purview by highlighting its “grammaticalisation” across languages. However, a closer reading exposes fundamental theoretical confusions within the model itself, even in English.

First, the purview system duplicates semantic and grammatical distinctions at the level of context. By rebranding the management of interpersonal meaning as a system of tenor (speaker/listener purview), the authors effectively recast mood distinctions in grammar (assertive vs non-assertive clauses) and engagement choices in semantics (hedging, modality) as independent context-level categories. Yet these distinctions are already modelled in English through grammatical and semantic systems—modality, and hedging. Treating them as a separate system of purview creates redundancy: the model purports to operate at the context stratum, but its categories mirror those already realised on the content plane.

Second, the model blurs the boundaries between levels of stratification. By claiming that purview operates at the tenor/context level while simultaneously being “distributed across a range of interpersonal grammatical systems” in English, the authors collapse context and realisation. The examples they give (falling vs rising tone, supine hand posture) are clearly expression-level realisations, yet the framework treats them as purview at the abstract contextual level. This confounding of strata undermines the internal coherence of the model.

Third, the internal logic of purview is overextended even within a single language. The system posits speaker and listener purview as orthogonal variables (+/–), yet the examples reveal a complex interplay in which realisation, tone, hedging, and body language interact in ways the binary schema cannot adequately capture. For instance, falling vs rising tone on a declarative both interacts with hedging and engagement choices, yet the model reduces these nuanced interactions to a simplistic +/– matrix. This risks oversimplifying dynamic meaning-making processes in discourse.

Finally, the theoretical framing obscures what is genuinely novel. Purview is presented as a new resource for interpersonal meaning, but in effect it repackages already known features of mood and engagement under a different label. While the authors’ terminology may highlight subtle nuances of control in conversation and text, it does so at the cost of creating conceptual inflation: multiple layers of labels now describe phenomena that are already systematically captured by grammar and semantics in canonical SFL terms.

In short, even within English, the purview framework duplicates, conflates, and oversimplifies existing distinctions between grammar, semantics, and context. Its theoretical ambitions exceed the clarity of its conceptual design, leaving readers with a model that is internally inconsistent and redundant, rather than genuinely explanatory. 

Purview Overstated: Rebranding Rhetorical Stance as Context

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 79-80):

This contrasts with the prosody of assertion, with few exceptions, in Text 3.7. By virtue of this purview, this report on different types of matter establishes the ‘expert’ stance that is so highly values in scientific texts:

Physicists currently view matter as being grouped into three families – quarks, leptons and bosons. The standard model explains interactions in terms of these families, which it further classifies as follows:

1. Matter particles. These are fundamental particles (that is, they have no known smaller parts). They are the quarks and leptons. 

2. Force-carrier particles. Each type of fundamental force is caused by the exchange of force-carrier particles (also called messenger or exchange particles). These are the fundamental (or gauge) bosons. They include photons and gluons.

Text 3.7. Report on types of matter (Warren, 2003, pp. 246-247)

As these texts illustrate, purview is a resource that can be drawn upon to negotiate social relations in dialogue as we manage turns in conversation. But it is also a resource we can draw on in monologue to manage the play of voices that permeate our texts. In the informational plaque, the writer is clearly aiming to engage the reader through putting forward possibilities, while at the same time making it clear that they are pure speculation. In the scientific text, the aim is to present its knowledge in an expert voice.

ChatGPT Comments:

This excerpt again illustrates the drift toward conflating purview (a category they are attempting to develop) with stance, voice, or rhetorical orientation that are already well captured in existing systemic-functional theory.

1. Purview reduced to “stance.”
   The contrast drawn here between the Wedding Cake Island plaque and the scientific text boils down to whether the writer projects speculation or authority. But SFL already has the categories of engagement (expansion vs contraction), projection, and modality to capture this. To rebrand these as “purview” obscures what is already theoretically available, while offering no sharper analytic purchase.

2. Misdescription of scientific discourse.
   The claim that the “prosody of assertion” in the scientific text derives from “purview” is misleading. Scientific texts establish authority through institutionalised conventions of projection, technicality, and taxonomic structure (Halliday & Martin 1993; Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), not through some abstract manipulation of purview. What they are describing is simply the conventionalised voice of authoritative report.

3. Epistemology vs rhetoric.
   The real contrast is between a text that foregrounds rhetorical play (speculation for engagement) and one that foregrounds epistemic closure (assertion of established knowledge). The authors’ account misframes this as a difference in “purview,” rather than in register, and appraisal orientation.

4. Theoretical redundancy.
   By treating purview as a kind of meta-resource that explains both dialogic turn-taking and monologic stance-taking, the authors stretch the category until it collapses into vagueness. This adds another layer of terminology without increasing explanatory clarity.

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⚖️ Overall assessment:

What’s presented here as “purview” is nothing more than the contrast between speculative engagement and authoritative assertion. The phenomena are real, but the concept of purview contributes nothing distinctive to their explanation.

Purview Misapplied: Mistaking Rhetorical Play for Epistemic Positioning

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 78-9):

As for all other resources presented in this chapter, purview is not just a resource for managing the flow of conversation; it can also nuance positions in monologic text. To exemplify this we can consider the use of purview in Text 3.6, an informational plaque about a rocky outcrop off the coast of Coogee Beach in Sydney, Australia known as Wedding Cake Island. This text begins with an open proposition about the name of the island (Why is it called Wedding Cake Island?), which is then rejected internally as not being answerable – No-one really seems to know for sure. The rest of the text then plays with purview in order to put possibilities out there and leave it to the reader to decide - beginning with the proposal so use your imagination!

Why is it called Wedding Cake Island?

No-one really seems to know for sure – so use your imagination! Perhaps the white spray from breaking waves over its long low shape is reminiscent of white icing on a wedding cake. Or perhaps hundreds of seagulls frosted the cake with their whitened droppings over the edge of the rocks! Or……… What do YOU think?

Text 3.6. Informational plaque about Wedding Cake Island, Coogee Beach, Sydney, Australia. (Randwick City Council nd.)

After proposing that readers use their imagination, the following two sentences put forward propositions, but do so with no speaker purview (marked by perhaps and the two linking connectors realised by or): Perhaps the white spray from breaking waves over its long low shape is reminiscent of white icing on a wedding cake. Or perhaps hundreds of seagulls frosted the cake with their whitened droppings over the edge of rocks! Or……… 

Here, the unfinished clause complex marked by the second or, with its long set of 'ellipsis' makers (………), emphases that other possibilities are there, and that the writer is not tied to them (or even proposing them). Together, this heavily weakens speaker purview as far as explaining the name of wedding cake island is concerned. As a final step, purview is handed over to the reader through an another open proposition, What do YOU think? – with purview highlighted through the capitalisation of YOU.

ChatGPT Comments:

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 79) analyse the informational plaque about Wedding Cake Island as a “play with purview,” in which speaker commitment is progressively weakened before finally being handed over to the reader. But once again, their account is grounded less in the grammar than in the categories of their own framework.

The examples they cite are all readily described using established resources of mood and modality:

• “Why is it called Wedding Cake Island?” → an interrogative.”

• “No-one really seems to know for sure – so use your imagination!” → a negatively declarative clause followed by an imperative.”

• “Perhaps the white spray …” / “Or perhaps hundreds of seagulls …” → modalised declaratives, realised through modal adjuncts and conjunctive relations.

• “Or … What do YOU think?” → an elliptical disjunctive conjunction followed by a second interrogative, with tonic prominence — realising the Focus of New information — marked by orthographic highlighting.

Every feature invoked here—interrogative, imperative, modality, ellipsis—is already accounted for within the canonical grammar of mood and modality. To redescribe these as manoeuvres of “purview” is not to clarify meaning but to overlay a redundant system that blurs the distinction between grammatical resources and interpretive stance.

The plaque does not “play with purview”; it exploits interpersonal mood structures to draw the reader in, shift footing, and dramatise indeterminacy. The interpersonal nuance arises from grammatical mood choices and modalisation strategies, not from a notional resource of “purview.”

In this way, “purview” functions less as an analytic tool than as a conceptual gloss on phenomena that are already systematically described. It thereby risks confusing the descriptive model: presenting grammatical mood as if it were merely an instantiation of “purview,” rather than recognising “purview” as a mislabelled abstraction from those very same grammatical categories.

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The Broader Pattern: “Purview” as Redescription of Mood, Modality, and Projection

What this case shows is consistent with the earlier examples: the category of purview is sustained not by demonstrating an independent system, but by recasting existing grammatical resources in its own terms.

• In the earlier projection example, purview was defined by detaching speaker commitment from the logico-semantic relation of projection, thereby confusing the distinction between process + projection and interpersonal stance.

• In this “Wedding Cake Island” example, purview is defined by detaching speaker commitment from the mood system (declarative, interrogative, imperative) and from modalisation.

The common manoeuvre is:

1. Identify a case where interpersonal commitment is at stake (projection, modality, speaker stance).

2. Abstract “purview” as the resource supposedly managing this commitment.

3. Re-describe the existing grammar in terms of “purview,” thereby erasing the systematic distinctions that are already established (projection vs mood vs modality).

The result is a pseudo-system that appears to unify diverse resources, but at the cost of explanatory clarity. Instead of showing how interpersonal meanings are realised differently across strata, the model collapses those realisations into a single notional category of “purview.”

Thus, “purview” is not an independent resource. It is a gloss on the analyst’s interpretation of speaker commitment, superimposed on grammatical systems that already account for the phenomena in question. This is why, across examples, purview can only be demonstrated by misdescribing projection, mood, or modality. 

Purview Inflation: Seeing Two Propositions Where There Is Only One

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 78):

Finally, instances that involve projection, such as (52) from a news report given in Martin and White (2005, p. 112), also establish multiple propositions with the potential for different purview (plus sourcing – see Chapter 4).

Here, the reporter does not tie themselves to whether or not the Church of England’s status is indefensible (airing: – speaker purview; – listener purview), but they do assert the fact that a bishop today described the Church of England’s established status as indefensible (+ speaker purview; – listener purview).

 

ChatGPT Comments:

The example in (52) is mis-analysed. Structurally, we are dealing with a single clause: an attributive clause with assignment (A bishop today describes X as Y). This clause realises only one proposition. It is not a clause complex, nor does it project a secondary clause.

The authors, however, construe the instance as if it contained two propositions:

• an “air/proposition” (The Church of England’s established status is indefensible), and

• an “assert/proposition” (A bishop describes…).

By construing a clause as clause complex, the purview framework doubles the number of propositions where there is only one. This not only misrepresents the grammar but also artificially inflates the analytical complexity. Such inflation obscures rather than clarifies the semiotic organisation of discourse.

The added claim that the reporter withholds commitment to the indefensibility of the status, while asserting that a bishop described it as such, depends entirely on this misidentification. There is no separate “inner” proposition that can be independently assigned purview. What the reporter does is to assert a single relational attribution, not to air one proposition and assert another.

In short, the framework here does not clarify interpersonal stance but fabricates distinctions by misconstruing clause structure. And if purview relies on such misconstruals to generate its analytical categories, then the system itself cannot be trusted to track meaning but only to project its own confusions onto the grammar.

Purview Confounded: Duplicating Grammar and Semantics as Context

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 78):

This opens space for reconsidering examples such as (49) above along the same lines, replayed here as (51). Externally speaking, considered in terms of whether or not mass extinctions were caused by changes in sea level or disruptions in the food chain, the proposition is aired – the may indicates that the author is not tied to whether or not this is the case. A response could render this proposition with something like No, they weren’t – focusing on whether or not this was the cause, rather than any negotiation of whether it could be the cause. On the other hand, the possibility of them being caused this way is asserted (through the use of a declarative without any tagging). One could focus on the could and render the possibility of them being caused by saying something like No, they couldn’t have. Asserting this suggests that rejecting the position along these lines would be more socially risky. But for academic discourse in particular, the play between the two purviews given through NEGOTIATION (the statement) and ENGAGEMENT (through the modality could) allows an author to have their cake and eat it too – to assert something baldly while not tying themselves to its actuality.

ChatGPT Comments:

In this excerpt, Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 78) propose a dual-layered system of purview in which external purview (– speaker; + listener) “airs” a proposition, while internal purview (+ speaker; – listener) simultaneously “asserts” its possibility. The example in (51), concerning mass extinctions, is intended to illustrate how an academic author can assert something baldly without committing to its factual actuality.

From a systemic-functional standpoint, however, this theorising is deeply problematic. The authors relocate what are fundamentally clause-level interpersonal distinctions and engagement up into the realm of context (tenor: purview). Grammar and semantics, language, are treated as independent contextual variables, effectively conflating content and context in a manner that SFL explicitly resists. This move is conceptually confused: the internal/external purview distinction does not describe a separate level of social organisation but merely re-describes the interplay of hedging and assertion already encoded in modality.

Further, the dual purview framing introduces unnecessary complexity without explanatory payoff. By splitting a single clause into “external” and “internal” propositions, the system duplicates semantic distinctions at the level of tenor. The distinction between commitment to actuality and commitment to possibility is culturally and register-specific, and cannot reliably support a generalised system of context. The authors’ discussion of “having their cake and eating it too” highlights this: it is less an insight into social interaction than a re-labelling of standard hedging practices in academic English.

In short, the dual purview model is theoretically confused, duplicative, and inconsistent with SFL’s canonical stratification. External and internal purviews do not constitute a new distinction of context; they are a misapplied reinterpretation of what is already realised grammatically and semantically. The excerpt exemplifies the broader issue with purview: by elevating grammar and semantics into tenor, the authors obscure the very mechanisms they claim to describe.

Duplicating Meaning: Grammatical Metaphor Misread as Context in Purview

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 77-8):

Heteroglossia often involves instances that in fact put forward two (or more) propositions. This opens space to nuance the purview of each position at the same time. For example, (47) above could alternatively have been written as (50).

In this instance, the proposition realised through the embedded clause the organ screen in the stables was designed by Thomas Chippendale indicates – speaker purview (airing), by virtue of the heteroglossic scoping given by it is possible. That is, the speaker is not committed to the proposition about whether or not the organ screen in the stables was designed by Thomas Chippendale. But the ranking clause it is possible... is baldly asserted; the speaker here is committing themselves to it being possible. In other words there are two propositions being put forward with different purview – whether or not the organ screen was designed by Thomas Chippendale is left open, but the possibility that it could have been designed by him is asserted. The distinction between (50), it is possible that.., and (47), possibly, is what Halliday refers to as explicit objective (it is possible that...) vs implicit objective (possibly) modality (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p. 689). Once again we can interpret this opposition in terms of internal and external purview – the proposition of whether or not the design was by Thomas Chippendale is externally aired, but the assessment of its possibility is internally asserted.

ChatGPT Comments:

In this excerpt, the authors attempt to nuance purview through heteroglossic constructions, using (50) to illustrate how an embedded clause can create distinct internal and external purview readings. While the example is linguistically interesting, the account problematically conflates grammatical metaphor with context. Specifically, the authors treat the heteroglossic scoping of it is possible as a separate instance of purview at the level of tenor (context), when in fact this is a classic case of grammatical metaphor operating within the clause itself. The embedded clause the organ screen in the stables was designed by Thomas Chippendale is not introducing a new contextual variable; it realises a semantic expansion.

By reifying internal vs. external purview in this way, the authors effectively duplicate semantic distinctions at the contextual stratum, violating the SFL principle that context (here, tenor) and semantics (here, modality and engagement) are distinct strata, with the latter realising the former. The example conflates the assessment of possibility (internal assertion) with the aired proposition about the design itself (external), treating each as separate contextual positions rather than as grammatical-semantic realisations that encode stance. In short, the conceptual apparatus of purview risks obscuring the actual grammatical mechanism at play, turning a well-known instance of objective modality into an artefact of context.

This approach exemplifies a broader pattern in the book: reinterpreting lexicogrammatical or semantic phenomena as if they were contextual variables, rather than carefully tracking the stratification from semantics to context. While the internal/external purview distinction is analytically neat, its application here stretches the theoretical framework in ways that are not justified by the data or by canonical SFL theory. 

Purview Meets Engagement: Collapsing Strata in SFL

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 77):

In addition, purview variables can be realised through choices in engagement. For example, monoglossic statements will typically realise an assertion (+ speaker purview; – listener purview), as in the example we saw above (replayed as (46) below).

(46) Mother: You’ll have a lovely day pet. assert/proposition

In terms of Martin and White’s (2005) model of engagement, heteroglossic expansion resources on the hand will typically realise no speaker purview, in addition to any rendering noted above (Zhang 2020c). Adapting examples from Martin and White (2005, p. 107), heteroglossic entertain resources typically indicate neither speaker nor listener purview, and so air their proposition, as in (47) and (48).

(47) The organ screen in the stables was possibly designed by Thomas Chippendale air/proposition
(48) Mass extinctions could have been caused by major changes in sea level or disruptions in the food chain. air/proposition

When interacting with tagging resources, this – speaker purview option may also combine with + listener purview to pose a proposition, as in the constructed example in (49).

(49) The organ screen in the stables was possibly designed by Thomas Chippendale, d’you reckon? pose/proposition

ChatGPT Comments:

In this excerpt, Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 77) extend the system of purview into the realm of engagement, claiming that certain engagement choices—monoglossic versus heteroglossic statements—can realise speaker and listener purview options. They provide examples of assertions, posing, and airing propositions mapped to engagement resources (e.g., heteroglossic entertain → air).

The problem lies in the conflation of strata. In systemic functional linguistics, engagement is a semantic system realised in the lexicogrammar, and prosodic or paralinguistic features may realise content on the expression plane. Doran, Martin & Zappavigna, however, treat engagement as contextual: a system of tenor (purview). By claiming that heteroglossic expansion resources automatically realise “no speaker purview” or that tagging constructs can create a pose, they are effectively duplicating semantic categories at the level of context, rather than analysing how these semantic resources are realised in text or talk.

This raises a broader concern: the system of purview, when applied in this way, risks collapsing the stratification of language, turning lexicogrammar and semantics into context. While the examples are interesting pedagogically, the theoretical move stretches the SFL model beyond its intended distinction between context (field, tenor, mode) and the lexicogrammatical/semantic systems that realise it. In other words, the approach conflates meaning-in-context with meaning-in-text, which undermines the explanatory clarity that stratified systemic functional theory is designed to provide.

Reviewer Comments:

d’you reckon is not a "tagging resource" since, unlike wasn't it?, it does not reprise the Finite and the Subject of the clause.

Rebranding Mood and Engagement as Context: A Stratificational Misstep

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 76-7):

As the examples above suggest, the potential realisations of purview options are diverse – for one thing, purview is very sensitive to phonological and paralinguistic (‘body language’) choices (Halliday & Greaves, 2008; Ngo et al., 2022). For example, like for wh- interrogatives, a distinction between the falling tone 1 and rising tone 2 on a declarative would often distinguish assert from pose.

(44) Kristy: //1 I don’t want to go away from you // assert/proposition

(45) Mother: //2 you don't want to go to Dee’s?// pose/proposition

Similarly, an open posture, supine hand position and/or decentred facial features would typically lessen speaker purview paralinguistically (what (Ngo et al., 2022, p. 144) calls paralinguistic expansion).

ChatGPT Comments:

In their discussion of tenor, Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 76–7) introduce the system of purview, which they locate explicitly at the level of context. At first glance, this seems like a straightforward extension of systemic modelling into new semiotic terrain. But if we look more closely, the theoretical footing becomes much less secure.

The problem is that the categories instantiated in purview are not distinctive features of context at all. Rather, they are drawn wholesale from systems that have long been established at lower strata:

• mood at the level of grammar

• engagement at the level of semantics

In other words, what is presented as a system of context is in fact a duplication of grammar and semantics under a new label.

This move creates several problems:

1. Redundancy. Mood and engagement already provide powerful accounts of how interactional stance is construed and realised. Relabelling these same oppositions as “purview” does no additional theoretical work — it simply duplicates categories already accounted for elsewhere in the stratification.

2. Circularity. If purview is said to be realised by tone, gesture, hand orientation, and so on, we immediately face a problem: mood and engagement are already realised by these same resources. The theory starts chasing its own tail.

3. Stratificational incoherence. In the canonical Hallidayan model, context is a higher-order semiotic stratum, realised by semantics. Its function is to model the situation type, not to repeat semantic or grammatical systems in disguise. By shifting mood and engagement “up” into tenor, context ceases to be an independent plane of abstraction. It collapses into a duplicate description of what is already present in the strata below.

What is at stake here is not just terminological neatness, but the integrity of the architecture itself. If context can be populated by rebranded grammatical and semantic categories, then the delicate explanatory hierarchy of SFL is undermined. Context no longer provides a theory of situation, but becomes an echo chamber of lower-level systems.

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That’s the kernel of it: the “purview” system does not open up new explanatory ground at the level of tenor; it merely duplicates existing accounts, blurring the very stratificational distinctions on which SFL depends.

Reviewer Comments:

See Problems With The Authors' Analysis Of Paralinguistic Engagement