Misapplying The Trinocular Perspective: 'From Above'

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 58, 59, 60):

Looking from ‘above’, proposals and propositions also allow us to distinguish different types of genre. Looking at persuasive texts, for example, analytical expositions such as Text 3.1 argue for a stance of some sort – in this case that the world’s best animal is a butterfly. That is, analytical expositions argue for a proposition. … 

By contrast, hortatory expositions argue for action … . Hortatory expositions therefore argue for a proposal. … 

Texts in the political sphere in particular often tender multiple proposals. … 

Moving beyond persuasive texts, the distinction between proposition and proposal allows us to distinguish different types of factual text as well. Procedures, for example, put forward series of activities as proposals, in order to step through how to do something. … 

By contrast, explanations present activities as sets of interconnected propositions …

Reviewer Comments:

To be clear, 'looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 504). So looking at the semantic stratum from above means treating proposals and propositions as the expression of field, tenor and mode, the systems of the stratum above the semantic stratum. The authors' however, skip this stratum and treat proposals and propositions as the expression of genre. In their model, it is field, tenor and mode, not proposals and propositions, that are the expression of genre.

In Halliday's original stratification, however, what the authors model as a genre stratum is modelled as rhetorical mode, the textual dimension of context. Viewed this way, looking at proposals and propositions from above means looking at them, coherently, as the expressions of mode.

Cf. Halliday (1994: 363):

Mistaking Semantic Categories For Causes And Misapplying The Trinocular Perspective: 'From Below'

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 58):

From the perspective of the model being developed in this book, the distinction between propositions (information) and proposals (actions) determines what can be negotiated in dialogue. 

Looking from ‘below’ in terms of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar, proposals tend to be realised through action exchanges (Berry, 1981b; Martin, 1992; Ventola, 1987), goods and services speech functions (i.e. commands, offers and their responses (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014)), imperatives and options in modulation (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). Propositions on the other hand tend to be realised through knowledge exchanges (Berry 1981b, Ventola 1978, Martin 1992), information speech functions (questions, statements etc.), indicatives (declaratives and interrogatives) and options in modalisation (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014).

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This formulation reverses the logical order of dependency. In SFL theory, it is the commodity of exchange that motivates the semantic distinction between propositions (negotiating information) and proposals (negotiating action). The functions of giving or demanding goods-&-services versus information arise in response to interactional needs, not as preconditions that restrict what can be negotiated.

To claim that the distinction itself determines what can be negotiated treats it as a kind of system-internal governor of dialogue — a misunderstanding of how meaning is enacted. Semantic systems in SFL are mobilised to construe social activity, not imposed upon it from above.

This confusion reflects a broader slippage: the projection of analytic categories back onto the processes they were designed to describe. When semantic typologies are mistaken for causal mechanisms, we drift into a logic in which meaning potential appears to precede and constrain context — a reversal of the principle that semantics realises context, not the other way around.

In short: the proposition/proposal distinction is not a gatekeeper of negotiation, but a reflection of its semantic organisation.

[2] The authors claim to be “looking from ‘below’ in terms of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar” in order to describe the realisation of proposals and propositions. But this phrasing reveals a fundamental confusion about stratified semiotic structure.

In Systemic Functional Theory, looking from below refers to examining a stratum from the standpoint of the stratum beneath it — treating the higher stratum as content and the lower stratum as its mode of expression (Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 504). From this perspective, we can describe how a semantic category such as proposal is realised lexicogrammatically through systems like mood (imperatives, offers) and modulation (obligations, inclinations).

However, the authors contradict the logic of this perspective by claiming to be “looking from ‘below’ in terms of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar.” This conflates two distinct strata: discourse semantics, where speech functions such as proposals and propositions are located, and lexicogrammar, where systems such as mood and modality operate.

In effect, they name the correct perspective — from below — but frame it as if the semantic stratum is the lens from which they are looking. This inverts the logic of realisation: one does not “look from below” in terms of the higher stratum.

A clearer and theoretically consistent formulation would be:

Looking from below, we can examine how the semantic distinction between proposals and propositions — speech functions — is realised in the lexicogrammar via systems of mood and modality. 

This preserves the direction of realisation, respects the distinction between strata, and applies Halliday & Matthiessen’s framework with fidelity.

Interpersonal Fog: When Linguistic Resources Are Mistaken For Social Roles

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 56-7):

Negotiating meaning is a two-way affair. People can affiliate, align, gossip, attack, chat etc. by rendering meanings, but they can also do so by tendering meaning. The way people tender meanings implicates a range of interpersonal systems – in particular those of NEGOTIATION, concerned with how people exchange meanings in dialogue (Berry, 1981a; Martin, 1992; Ventola, 1987) and ENGAGEMENT, concerned with how people manage the play of different voices (Martin & White, 2005). As we mentioned in the previous chapter, we are particularly concerned with how these two resources interact as they work together. Work by Muntigl (2009), Kim et al. (2023) and Zhang (2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021) in particular have highlighted how people position each other as they work toward consensus. These systems in turn implicate a wide range of interpersonal grammatical systems – including the core system of MOOD as well as systems often positioned as supporting MOOD choices, such as TAGGING and MODALITY (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). The way all of these systems engage with tone choices in phonology is also part of the picture (Halliday & Greaves, 2008). 

In short, to understand how people organise social relations, it is not enough to just understand how people react; we also have to look carefully at how people put meaning forward – we draw on a full set of interpersonal resources in language.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This continues the confusion between context and language. Specifically, the authors mistake the interpersonal linguistic resources for realising tenor for tenor itself, the roles and relationships of the interlocutors in the cultural setting. The authors simply do not understand what different levels of symbolic abstraction actually means, and the sense in which levels are distinct from each other. It is from this failure of understanding that this entire publication proceeds.

[2] The authors here demonstrate their lack of understanding of stratification by using the term 'implicate', which does not describe the relation of symbolic abstraction, instead of the term 'realise', which does. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269).

[3] To be clear, SFL Theory models language in context. The notion of understanding 'how people organise social relations' by just understanding 'how people react' is a rhetorical straw man.

Positioning Mispositioned: Theorising ‘Position’ at the Semantics–Context Interface

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 56): 

For example, in Kristy and her mother’s dialogue (introduced in the previous chapter), Kristy’s mother often positions Kristy to agree with what she has said. For example, in (1), she uses the tag ‘don’t you?’, to suggest that she expects Kristy will support her position.

In other situations both Kristy and her mother put things forward in ways that leave more space for the other to disagree or reject what has been tendered. For example in (2), Kristy and her mother uses what about and how about to soften the impact of what they are proposing making it easier for each to reject them.

These examples also illustrate that what is being negotiated can vary. In (1) above, Kristy’s mother is putting forward some information – a proposition – to be agreed with or not. In (2), Kristy and her mother are discussing possible actions (proposals) that they could do.

Reviewer Comments:

Guest commentary by ChatGPT

On the surface, these observations are plausible enough. But the deeper issue lies in the authors’ theoretical handling of position itself. What is being positioned, and where? What kind of construct is a position?

The authors repeatedly treat position and meaning as effectively interchangeable — a confusion that becomes theoretically untenable when traced across strata. According to the authors’ own model, positioning belongs to the stratum of context (specifically to their tenor system), while meaning belongs to semantics. To use a Hallidayan framework: context specifies the cultural setting; semantics encodes it as meaning; and lexicogrammar realises it in wordings.

In the examples above, however, the so-called positions are nothing more than meanings being exchanged — i.e. interpersonal semantic selections. The tag don’t you? is a demand for a confirming response; how about I get you dressed? is a proposal realised in mood and modality. These are all linguistic moves by which meanings are negotiated — and through which social relations are enacted. The tenor of the situation is not being described, but being realised in the ongoing exchange of meaning.

If we take seriously the claim that positioning is a contextual system (as the authors propose), then it cannot simultaneously be a set of semantic acts within dialogue. This would collapse the very distinction between semantics and context — a distinction that is essential to any stratal model. Indeed, it seems more accurate to say that positioning is construed in language: that is, what the authors identify as positioning is best analysed as a semantic complex that enacts tenor, rather than a system that specifies it.

To mistake semantic enactments of intersubjective stance for contextual systems of tenor is to misplace the phenomenon across strata — a slippage that undermines the integrity of the theoretical architecture. Rather than clarifying the interplay between semantics and context, the authors reintroduce confusion by treating generalisations over meaning as if they were systems of context.

The lesson here is not simply terminological, but theoretical: we must attend carefully to the stratal location of our constructs. Positioning, if it is to function as a contextual system, must be distinct from the meanings by which it is enacted — not conflated with them.

Positioning Mispositioned: Stratal Collapse in the Semantics–Context Interface

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 56):

In the previous chapter we explored how people react to various positions through rendering. We noted that people can render positions that have been previously tabled in dialogue as separate moves, or they can render implied positions that have not yet been introduced. We also saw that people can render positions at the same time as they tender them. Throughout that chapter we were concerned with the different ways people can react to positions, in terms of supporting them, rejecting them, noting them and others, and the ways these can be realised. What we did not explore, however, was the different ways people put things forward for negotiation – the different ways people tender meanings. This is the focus of the present chapter. In particular, we will focus on how people tender meanings so as to position others to respond – to support or reject, to do something or to say something, or to tender a whole new set of meanings.

Reviewer Comments:

Guest commentary by ChatGPT

This paragraph makes visible a foundational confusion in the authors’ account: the conflation of meaning with position, and the mis-stratalisation of positioning itself. According to the authors, speakers “tender meanings so as to position others to respond” — a formulation that oscillates between the semantic and the contextual without distinguishing them.

In systemic functional theory, tenor is not a behavioural feature of text but a configuration of intersubjective relations — that is, a dimension of context construed through linguistic choices. It is enacted by, but not identical with, those choices. “Positioning,” as described here, is thus not tenor itself but a semantic resource through which tenor is construed. If positioning is treated as a linguistic act — as this chapter does — then it must be located at the level of semantics, not context.

By treating positioning as a component of tenor while simultaneously analysing it in terms of specific wordings (e.g. don’t you, how about), the authors misplace it both ontologically and stratally. The result is a blurred theoretical frame in which context is reduced to language, and language inflated to context — a move that ultimately erodes the explanatory power of both.

Problems With The Summary Of 'Rendering Options And Their Common Realisations'

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 53-4):

To sum up this chapter, we can synthesise the options for rendering as in Table 2.2. In this table, we have included some common realisations for key options in rendering.

Table 2.2 – Rendering options and their common realisations

Reviewer Comments:

To be clear, Table 2.2 exemplifies a recurring problem in the chapter: the slippage between generalisation within language and abstraction above language. The rendering options actually constitute generalisations about the functions listed as common realisations, and on this basis, represent a proposed less delicate system of semantics. However, the authors mistake this scale of delicacy for a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction, and place these semantic options at the level of context, in their system of tenor: positioning.

Context in Crisis: Theoretical Faultlines in Genre Modelling

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 49, 53):

In terms of our understanding of the relation between genre and register (i.e., how our model of tenor fits in), the distinction between tendering and rendering offers a way of seeing key shifts in interpersonal meanings at each stage. … Indeed this distinction in tendering and rendering gives us a sense of the differences between the various persuasive genres. Discussions, as we have seen, will tend to tender opposed positions, and then render one with support and one with rejection. Expositions on the other hand, which give only one side of the argument, will tend to tender one position and render it with support via a series of tendered arguments. By contrast, challenges tender a position at the beginning of the text and immediately reject it, supporting this rejection with a series of tendered arguments.

By exploring rendering, we are also able to explore prosodies of interpersonal meaning that permeate texts, such as those that occur in story genres. … The distinction between tendering and rendering thus gives us a way of viewing genres interpersonally, in terms of how they negotiate social relations.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This raises the problematic nature of the authors' model of genre and register, first articulated in Martin (1992). In that work, Martin (p495) proposed modelling context of culture as genre and context of situation as register, with genre as a higher stratum of context, realised by register as a lower level. The main problems with this framework are as follows:

1. It misconstrues the instantiation relation of potential to instance, between culture and situation, as a realisation relation between levels of symbolic abstraction.
2. It misconstrues a subpotential of language, register, as a system of contextual potential, and despite this 'register' being mapped onto an instance of context (situation).

Genre itself, however, is a confusion of different theoretical locations:

1. As a type of text, it corresponds to 'text type' — that is, to register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.
2. As a taxonomy of culturally-valued uses of language (narratives, anecdotes etc.), it corresponds to the contextual system of (rhetorical) mode.
3. As structure (e.g. Thesis > Argument > Reinforcement), it is the semantic structure of text types that realise mode selections of a situation type.

ChatGPT Comments:

[1] This passage foregrounds a long-standing confusion in Martin’s theoretical architecture — namely, the stratification of genre above register as levels of context. In this model (Martin 1992: 495), genre is treated as context of culture, realised by register as context of situation. However, this misconstrues the instantiation relation between culture and situation (as potential to instance) as if it were a relation of realisation between strata — conflating ontological categories.

At the same time, register is also misconstrued — not as a subpotential of language (a theory of variation within language potential), but as if it were itself a contextual system. Despite this, register is paradoxically mapped onto the instance of context — the situation — leading to a collapsed mapping in which systemic variation is treated as structural environment. The confusion is threefold: (i) register is mislocated ontologically, (ii) genre is simultaneously a cultural taxonomy, a rhetorical mode, and a text type, and (iii) realisation is incorrectly imposed across what are in fact instantiation relations.

[2] Within this confused framework, the interpersonal functions of tendering and rendering — which are semantic-level choices realised in mood, modality, evaluation and so on — are then projected onto genre structures, as if these rhetorical stages are themselves shaped by interpersonal semantics. The authors don’t quite claim that genres tender and render, but rather that they are realised as different patterns of tendering and rendering at the register level. Yet this move flattens the relationship between semantics and text structure, mistaking textual prosody and argument structure (which are patterns of realisation over time) for the organisation of contextual genre types.

[3] This projection of interpersonal semantics into genre structure confuses system and structure: it treats meanings that arise from semantic selections in interaction as if they directly define genre classes, bypassing the register variables (field, tenor, mode) that would more appropriately model such meanings. The result is a genre typology grounded not in situation types but in imagined interpersonal trajectories, driven by the authors’ invented taxonomy of positioning (tendering, rendering, support, rejection), which is nowhere anchored in the stratified model they attempt to build on.

[4] Overall, the “distinction between tendering and rendering” does not offer a new way of “viewing genres interpersonally” so much as it exposes the structural weaknesses of a genre theory built on theoretical conflations. It reflects a persistent attempt to retrofit novel terminology (here, from their system of positioning) into a model of discourse that is already buckling under conceptual strain.

[5] Social relations (e.g. mother-child) are not negotiated; they are semiotically enacted. Meanings are negotiated.

Misreading Modality

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 47-8):

Looking at the I think now, as (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, pp. 686-687) notes, the I think here is unlikely to be providing a full proposition. We can see this by the fact that if we were to tag the clause, we would more likely tag in relation to the you’re upset, rather than the I think; We would more likely say: I think you’re upset because the TV wasn’t working, aren’t you; as opposed to I think you’re upset because the TV wasn’t working, aren’t I. Similarly, if Kristy was to support what her mother was saying, she would likely support the ‘you’re upset…’, rather than the ‘I think’ with Yeah, I am, rather than Yes, you do. This is because the I think is not presenting a proposition about thinking, but rather being used metaphorically to mean something like ‘probably’. In Halliday’s terms, it is an interpersonal metaphor realising modality. In this sense, the I think is in fact realising support for the idea that Kristy is upset because the TV isn’t working. As we will discuss in Chapters 4 and 5, the I think also makes explicit that what is being tendered is a personal opinion and it lowers the stakes of the position.

The I don’t think in the first line functions similarly to the second line, but realises a rejection. We can see this again by the fact that it is unlikely that we will reject the ‘thinking’ (Yes you do), but also the fact that the negation can be easily transferred to the you’re upset without significantly changing the meaning: I think you’re not really upset about me going (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p. 689). So Kristy’s mother has tendered two propositions in opposition to each other in order to reject one and support the other – i.e., that Kristy is not really upset about her going but that she is upset because the TV wasn’t working.

Reviewer Comments:

Guest commentary by ChatGPT

This discussion attempts to leverage Halliday’s account of interpersonal metaphor to justify the claim that I think in I think you’re upset because the TV wasn’t working constitutes a form of support in the authors’ tenor system of positioning. The claim appears to be that I think realises support for the proposition that follows, rather than functioning as a proposition in its own right.

[1] There is a serious category error here: I think is rightly analysed (in Halliday & Matthiessen 2014) as an interpersonal grammatical metaphor for modality, not as a move in a system of tenor-positioning such as “support” or “reject.” The authors ignore the distinction between interpersonal grammar and contextual tenor, collapsing them into one another in order to preserve the illusion of theoretical innovation.

[2] The suggestion that I think somehow “realises support” misconstrues both the nature of modality and the analytic function of interpersonal metaphor. I think modifies the speaker’s commitment to the proposition; it does not itself “support” that proposition in a second-order sense.

[3] Worse still, the authors treat grammatical diagnostics such as tag questions and preferred responses (e.g., aren’t you vs. aren’t I) as if they confirm the categories of their own invented tenor system. But these diagnostics are evidence for clause structure and mood, not for tenor roles or speaker positioning. This is a classic case of retrofitting grammatical facts to support a speculative model.

[4] Finally, the apparent opposition between I think you’re not really upset about me going and I think you’re upset because the TV wasn’t working is a red herring. The former encodes a single modalised proposition; it is not a rejection of a second speaker's stance. The claim that Kristy’s mother “tenders two propositions in order to support one and reject the other” is interpretive projection masquerading as analysis.

Interpretive Ventriloquism

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 47):

As noted above, we removed the I think from example (29) to simplify the analysis. This is because I think often marks what Halliday calls an interpersonal metaphor (or more specifically, a modality metaphor enacting explicit subjective modality; (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, pp. 686-687). In (32) we have included it along with the previous line that includes I don’t think.

As noted above, you’re really upset about me going and you’re upset because the TV wasn’t working each tender a proposition of you’re upset… and you’re really upset that in turn source rejections to Kristy of me going and the TV wasn’t working. These analyses are shown in the two columns on the right in (32).

Reviewer Comments:

[1] To be clear, grammatical metaphor is a junctional phenomenon since it includes the meanings of both the congruent and metaphorical expressions. Accordingly, both need to be included in text analysis. Moreover, by removing the metaphor of modality from the instance, the authors not only misrepresent the text as unmodalised, but also remove the proposition realised metaphorically by the projecting clause.

[2] In example (32), the analysis becomes entangled in its own invented categories. The mother is said to tender Kristy’s emotional state ("you’re upset") while sourcing to Kristy competing reasons for that state ("me going" vs. "the TV wasn’t working"). These are then evaluated by the authors as if Kristy were herself rejecting or supporting these reasons — and as if the mother were in turn supporting or rejecting Kristy’s supposed rejections. The result is a bizarre recursive loop: the mother rejects Kristy’s rejection of “me going” and supports Kristy’s rejection of “the TV wasn’t working.” Yet Kristy expresses no such stances. The entire analysis depends on stances attributed to her by the mother and then projected back onto her by the analyst. This is not interpersonal analysis; it is interpretive ventriloquism.

Rebranding Attitude as Positioning

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 46-7):

This discussion also brings us back to the point made above – namely that attitude itself can also indicate rejection or support, as long as there is a target or trigger for the attitude (i.e., it is not what Martin 2017b calls ‘moody’ affect or some other attitude without an explicit trigger or target, as in she’s happy and has no idea why). 

Kristy’s mother relies on this throughout the conversation, sourcing support or rejections to Kristy herself (see Chapter 4), in a bid to show her that she will in fact enjoy being out of the house (we have removed the ‘I think’ in (29) to simplify the analysis, but we will discuss it below). 

There is also one instance where Kristy’s mother renders support not for a full proposition, but for an item day.

This final example highlights that rendered meanings do not need to be whole propositions, but can in fact be of any stretch in meaning. We will return to this point in the following section.

Reviewer Comments:

This excerpt exemplifies the authors’ persistent conflation of semantic choices with contextual parameters—resulting in a confused and confusing analytical framework.

[1] The authors are rebranding positive and negative values within the semantic system of ATTITUDE (White 1998) as support and reject in their proposed contextual system of POSITIONING—which they situate in tenor, despite attending to linguistic resources, not role relationships.

[2] The claim that the mother “supports” day is analytically incoherent. It arises from treating lovely (a token of attitude) as a contextual stance rather than a semantic evaluation. It is you’ll have a lovely day that constitutes an arguable proposition—not the lexical item day in isolation.

The result is a form of reanalysis that prioritises terminological novelty over semantic clarity—obscuring meaning beneath a veneer of innovation.

At stake here is not an advance in theory but a rebranding exercise: established semantic systems are redescribed using newly coined contextual terms, giving the illusion of innovation where there is merely renaming.

Rebranding And Circular Reasoning

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 46):

As these examples show, the use of engagement can produce a text that is very interpersonally nuanced – rendering a proposition that may or may not have been stated, while at the same time tendering a new proposition. 

This gives some insight into why humanities texts, which regularly draw heavily on engagement, can at times be such ‘heavy going’ (i.e., why they can have such strong interpersonal mass (Martin, 2017/2020) – they are responding to a range of stances in their academic community while at the same time trying to put forward a stance themselves (Doran, 2020a, 2020b; Hood, 2010, 2022).

Reviewer Comments:

[1] To be clear, these examples have simply illustrated the interpersonal semantic systems of ENGAGEMENT and SPEECH FUNCTION. The authors, however, have recategorised such propositions using the paradigmatic features 'rendering' and 'tendering', and misunderstood these semantic moves as parameters of the contextual system of tenor, despite 'tenor' referring to 'the statuses and role relationships; who is taking part in the interaction' (Halliday 1994: 390).

[2] To be clear, the authors’ explanation here is circular: humanities texts are said to be ‘heavy going’ because they exhibit strong ‘interpersonal mass’, which in turn is defined by their reliance on ENGAGEMENT resources — the very thing that supposedly makes them heavy going. No independent criterion is offered for identifying or measuring ‘interpersonal mass’ apart from the difficulty it is invoked to explain. As such, the term functions as a rebranding of the problem, not an explanation of it — offering semantic tautology in place of theoretical insight.

Misrepresenting Modality Metaphor And Misunderstanding Negotiation

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 46):

In addition to one supporting and the other noting what is being tendered, there is a second difference between (27) and (28).

Looking grammatically, in (28) there are two clauses being given – a ranking clause It is possible… and an embedded clause there was an invasion. This means that there are two possibilities for rendering. For example, one may reject that there was an invasion by saying No, there wasn’t; or alternatively, one may reject the possibility that there was an invasion by saying No, it isn’t. This indicates that (in the absence of a modality metaphor; (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, pp. 686-687)), there are in fact two positions being tendered here, which is shown in the analysis – one by the ranking clause it is possible…, and one by the embedded clause there was an invasion, the latter of which is being rendered by the it is possible.

In (27), the probably does not tender a position separate to that of I’ll be home (i.e., we cannot negotiate probably independent of the whole position without tendering something new – something like It’s not only probably, but definitely). Thus, there is only one position being tendered. This is a distinction in Halliday’s terms between what he calls explicit objective modality (e.g., it is possible) and implicit objective modality (e.g., possibly).

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The authors claim this is “in the absence of a modality metaphor,” but what they describe is in fact a classic example of one. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 698) make clear:

The explicitly subjective and explicitly objective forms of modality are all strictly speaking metaphorical, since all of them represent the modality as being the substantive proposition.

That is precisely what we see in (28), where “It is possible” realises the modality not congruently but metaphorically, as a projecting clause.

What the authors call “two positions being tendered” in context are actually the two propositions (semantics) construed via this grammatical metaphor. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 688) explain:

What happens is that, in order … to claim explicitly that the probability is objective, the speaker construes the proposition as a projection and encodes … the objectivity (it is likely), in a projecting clause.

This is not a contextual issue of “positioning,” but a semantic issue of projection and modality metaphor.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue. The authors claim that probably in (27) does not “tender a position” separately from I’ll be home, implying that it cannot be negotiated independently. But in SFL, the arguability of a proposition derives from the Mood element, and probably — as a mood Adjunct — is part of that Mood element. It is available for negotiation: an interlocutor can challenge it directly (“Probably?”) without needing to construct a new proposal.

As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143, 150) clarify:

… if anything it is the Mood element that embodies the proposition rather than the remainder of the clause.

… the Mood element has a clearly defined semantic function: it carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event.

Once again, the authors collapse distinctions across strata and metafunctions, confusing a semantic projection structure with a contextual positioning move. 

Misunderstanding Interpersonal Semantics as Context

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 45-6):

Turning to the note option, these can be enacted through the heteroglossic option for entertain, where there is an acknowledgement of the possibility of different voices, but no explicit stance is taken.

A noting move in this kind of example will typically occur for the low and median positions of modality (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, pp. 178-179), e.g., using possible, perhaps, maybe, can, may etc. Higher modality, e.g., probably, likely, must, will, certainly etc., is more likely to realise some sort of support or reject (though see Chapter 3 for how this interacts with speaker and listener purview).

Reviewer Comments:

The authors propose ‘note’ as a subtype of ‘tender’, situated within their system of POSITIONING — which they treat as contextual (tenor). However, the example they give is clearly a move in an exchange — that is, a semantic choice in the interpersonal metafunction. 

‘Noting’ is the authors' rebranding of ‘entertaining’ of the ENGAGEMENT system (White 1998), as realised lexicogrammatically through modal expressions such as possible, perhaps, maybe, can, may, etc. These are resources of language, not of context. Once again, the authors conflate language and context, misunderstanding the stratified architecture of SFL.

Misunderstanding Interpersonal Meaning as Tenor

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 45, 55):

Support can be done through a range of heteroglossic proclaiming resources (Martin & White, 2005). In this case a position is endorsed, pronounced or concurred with, as in (26), but like (25) it renders the position it tenders.¹² 

Similarly in (27) Kristy’s mother supports the position that she will be home about the same time as Dee’s big kids get home by using probably.

 

¹² This example also illustrates the role of engagement in realising internal rendering. Here the of course is not rendering an opinion on whether they support or reject Indigenous lands being stolen, but rather is supporting this as a linguistic act – i.e. supporting it as true. We can contrast this with an external support – Fortunately, Indigenous lands were stolen, which is definitely not what is being said. Heteroglossia when used for rendering is often used for internal rendering in this sense, functioning as it does to manage the play of voices.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] Here the authors again rebrand the semantic system of ENGAGEMENT (White 1998) as their contextual system of tenor. In terms of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, each instance of 'support' is an initiating move in an exchange: a statement. On the other hand, as Halliday (1994: 390) puts it:

Tenor refers to the statuses and role relationships; who is taking part in the interaction.

i.e. not to the language that enacts those statuses and role relationships.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory the difference between of course and fortunately is not one of internal vs external ‘rendering’, but one of interpersonal meaning — specifically, between asseverative and qualificative comment Adjuncts (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 190–2). Of course realises the meaning ‘obviously’ (asseverative), while fortunately realises the meaning ‘luckily’ (qualificative). These are clearly linguistic resources — part of the speaker’s meaning potential — not contextual roles. The authors misattribute these semantic choices to their model of tenor.

Misunderstanding Moves In An Exchange (Semantics) As Tenor (Context)

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 45, 55n):

In addition to heteroglossic denial, rejections can also occur through distancing (Martin & White, 2005). In these cases the speaker indicates they do not align with what is being proposed (though with lower stakes; see Chapter 5). As shown in (25) (from Doran, 2020b),

 

in these instances the proposition they are rejecting is in fact specified, so we have underlined it and drawn a horizontal arrow between the rendering and the tendering. Like the rejections above, this instance also tenders a new proposition centred on the claim – which itself can be negotiated. That is, there are three things going on in (25). First, the Toolkit is tendering the proposition that the word settlement ignores the reality of Indigenous lands being stolen; second, it is rejecting this position through the distancing of claim; and third it is tendering the proposition that The UNSW Diversity Toolkit is claiming that the word settlement ignores reality.¹¹

 ¹¹ We can see this by the fact that when rejecting this statement using polarity such as ‘No, it doesn’t', this could be read as rejecting either that The UNSW Diversity Toolkit claims, or that the word settlement ignores the reality of…

Reviewer Comments:

The authors once again misclassify semantic moves as contextual parameters. What they describe as ‘rejecting’, ‘tendering’, and ‘rendering’ are clearly moves within an exchange structure — that is, options in the interpersonal semantics of speech function. These are part of language, not context. By treating these semantic moves as components of tenor — rather than as interpersonal meanings that realise it — the authors conflate language with the social context it enacts. This signals a fundamental misunderstanding of the stratification hierarchy in SFL, and an inability to distinguish the semantic resources of language from the cultural context they realise.

The Notion That A Repeated Proposition Is Not A Proposition

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 44-5, 55n):

¹⁰ There is a question here as to whether No, I won’t additionally tenders a negative proposition, as we argued for the full clauses in (20)-(22) and (24). Our interpretation is that replaying the Subject and Finite without the Residue, as is done in No I won’t, means the turn is not putting forward any new proposition, and so is best read as simply rendering – reacting to what was said previously. It is only when there is some adjustment of the Mood (Subject and Finite) – what Halliday calls a shift in the modal responsibility (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) – or the specification of Residue is there a new proposition tendered (Martin, 1992, p. 461ff). This is because any further rendering involving the same strategy will simply replay the Mood of the initial position:

You will be home late as well. – No I won’t. – Yes you will. –No you [sic] won’t etc. 

Having said that, some instances with this configuration would tender a new proposition, such as if the primary tone was placed on either the Subject and Finite to suggest some sort of contrast: 

- You will be home late as well. – No, I won’t; 

or if the Mood Adjunct and Mood are given on different tone groups: 

//No//^ I won’t//. 

Ultimately, evidence as to whether there is a new proposition being tendered will depend on how it is negotiated in the following discourse.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors confuse 'proposition' with 'new proposition', leading them to the self-contradictory conclusion that a repeated proposition is not a proposition.

[2] In terms of speech function, this exchange features four moves, all of which are propositions:

• You will be home late as well is the statement that initiates the exchange;
• No I won’t is a responding statement that contradicts the previous statement;
• Yes you will is a responding statement that contradicts the previous statement;
• No you I won’t is a responding statement that contradicts the previous statement.

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137).

[3] In the authors' terms, the proposition constitutes a 'tender' if it is subsequently 'rendered' (responded to), as in all the examples they provide.

Category Errors, Faulty Analogies, and Confusions Between Semantics and Context

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 44-5):

Here we are emphasising the similarities in tenor between rejection and support done dialogically and monologically.  

In terms of discourse semantics, this indicates similarities between heteroglossia, which offers resources for managing multiple voices, and negotiation (dialogica), which offers resources for managing multiple turns.  

Put another way, we are suggesting a parallel between (23), where the tendering and rendering is established across two turns, and (24) where the tendering and rendering occurs in a single turn.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] Here again the authors misunderstand language choices (tendering and rendering, rejection and support) as the cultural context of language (tenor). As Halliday (1994: 390) puts it:

Tenor refers to the statuses and role relationships; who is taking part in the interaction.

[2] Here the authors conflate the speaker’s semiotic resources — heteroglossia and negotiation — with the linguist’s modelling of those resources. To be clear, heteroglossia is the speaker’s resource for acknowledging other possible points of view (‘voices’), not a resource for “managing” them. Likewise, negotiation is the speaker’s system of potential moves in an exchange, not a resource for “managing” multiple turns.

[3] Here the authors set up the following proportionalities:

dialogue is to monologue as

heteroglossia is to negotiation as

two turns is to single turn

To be clear, proportional analogies rely on structural or functional equivalence: if A is to B as C is to D, then the relation between A and B must be of the same kind as the relation between C and D — whether it’s one of scale, category, realisation, or function.

But in this case, the analogy fails on all counts. Dialogue and monologue differ in interactional structure, not functional type; negotiation and heteroglossia belong to different semantic systems with distinct organising principles; and turns and voices are not even comparable units — the former are structural units of exchange, the latter semantic projections of alignment. No relational consistency holds across the three pairs.

[4] In terms of SPEECH FUNCTION, (23) is an initiating statement followed by a discretionary response — a contradiction — while (24) is simply an initiating statement with no response (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 137). The authors rebrand these moves in the exchange structure as ‘tender’ and ‘reject’, and misclassify them as features of context (tenor) rather than of language (semantics).

Negotiating Non-Finite Clauses As Tenor And Misunderstanding Engagement

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 44):

In (21), when her mother says I won’t be home later either she rejects a possible line of argument that Kristy could take that she will be home late (and tenders this as a proposition that could be argued).

And in (22) don’t get cranky, she pre-emptively rejects any acceptance of Kristy getting cranky.

As the analysis shows, in each of these cases the rejection is part of a full clause, which also tenders a (negative) proposition. The justification for this is that each of these positions can themselves be subsequently negotiated. As we will see, the use of engagement typically allows for both the rendering of a proposition while at the same time a tendering of another proposition. In the cases above, they reject an implied positive proposition, and tender the negative proposition.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This misconstrues interpersonal semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) as interpersonal context (tenor), and rebrands initiating moves as 'tender' and responding moves as 'render' ('reject'). In SFL, the mother's move I won't be home late either is just a statement that initiates an exchange (though the word either suggests it could also be a response to a previous move).

However, the authors also interpret the mother's statement as a contradicting response (rejection) to a future move that her daughter Kristy didn't actually make. This is analogous to interpreting the statement a triangle doesn't have four sides as a response to the unspoken move a triangle does have four sides.

[2] Again, this misconstrues interpersonal semantics (SPEECH FUNCTION) as interpersonal context (tenor), and rebrands initiating moves as 'tender' and responding moves as 'render' ('reject'). In SFL, the mother's move Don't get cranky is a command that initiates an exchange.

However, the authors also interpret the mother's command as a response (rejection) to a future move that her daughter Kristy didn't actually make.

[3] To be clear, the analysis shows that the rejections are being home late and Kristy getting cranky. The patently false claim is that the non-finite clause being home late is part of the finite declarative clause I won't be home late either, and the non-finite clause Kristy getting cranky is part of the finite imperative clause Don't get cranky.

[4] To be clear, this justification is invalid on two counts:

• clauses cannot be negotiated if they are non-finite;
• clauses cannot be negotiated if they are not spoken.

[5] This conflates the system of engagement with the structure of speech function. Engagement does not involve the “rendering” or “tendering” of propositions. Engagement models the positioning of propositions within dialogic space, not their role in an exchange structure. The claim reflects a category error that misrepresents engagement as a system of interpersonal action rather than one of semantic alignment.

[6] To be clear, what is said to be rejected is a future response that was not made. And, trivially, (22) is a proposal, not a proposition.

Misunderstanding Engagement And Rebranding A Discretionary Response As Context

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 43-4):

Various heteroglossic options within engagement which acknowledge and engage with other voices allow speakers to support, reject or note meanings that may or may not have been put forward (Doran, 2020b). For Kristy and her mother, these resources are often drawn upon to reject each other’s positions. They most often do this through heteroglossic denial, realised through explicit negation. As Martin and White (2005) explain, negation is not simply the logical opposite of a positive; rather it works to acknowledge the positive in order to deny it. In this sense, both Kristy and her mother render rejections of positions that have not yet been tendered, so as to, in some sense, ‘head off’ possible lines of argument. 

For example in (20), when Kristy says, don’t want to go out today, she rejects through the n’t the idea that she would want to go out today (a curved arrow is used to indicate that the rejection is to something that hasn’t been previously said). At the same time, by using a full clause, she tenders the proposition that she does not want to go out.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] This characterisation of engagement misrepresents the system's function. Engagement does not allow speakers to “support, reject or note meanings”; rather, it models how speakers position propositions with respect to alternative voices within a dialogic space. To describe engagement as supporting or rejecting meanings confuses semantic positioning with SPEECH FUNCTION. 

The phrase “meanings that may or may not have been put forward” further suggests that engagement tracks actual prior speech acts, rather than positioning utterances within a semantic space of potential viewpoints. This misunderstanding becomes foundational for several later claims.

[2] To be clear, don’t want to go out today is language, not context (tenor). In terms of SPEECH FUNCTION, as an initiating move ("tendering"), it is a statement.

But if it is interpreted as a response to an imaginary move ("rendering"), it could be any of the discretionary responses: rejection of an offer, refusal of a command, contradiction of a statement, or disclaimer to a question, because the SPEECH FUNCTION of the initiating move is unknown. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137): 

Problems With The Second 'Rendering' System Network

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 42-3):

Adding these choices into our system network gives us Figure 2.2. In this figure the joint square bracket and brace means and/or. That is, one may choose to render or tender or both. Thus this network says that in tenor, one may tender a position or render a position or both at the same time. If rendering, this may address or note the position (with the various subtypes described for Figure 2.1 above), and any of these renderings may be done externally or internally.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] To be clear, this network misrepresents a system of potential language options as a system of tenor, the interpersonal context that is realised by such language choices.

[2] To be clear, this network has no entry condition or realisation statements.

Rebranding Nominal Group Structure As Tenor

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 41):

In addition to being used in dialogue, internal rendering is often used to provide a ‘meta’ comment on language, often in service of establishing higher level periodicity (Martin & Rose, 2003/2007) and involving semiotic entities – such as question, statement etc. (Hao, 2020). 

This is illustrated in (17), where cultural critic Raymond Williams renders a question by 19th century Scottish cultural critic Thomas Carlyle as famous. This example also illustrates how rendering can be prospective of what is to come, rather than just retrospective.

Reviewer Comments:

[1] To be clear, dialoging and commenting are languaging, and so not tenor, which is context, not language. This is the fundamental theoretical misunderstanding that invalidates the model tendered in this publication.

[2] Martin's 'periodicity' is his rebranding of writing pedagogy as linguistic theory. See the examinations of periodicity in Martin & Rose (2007) here.

[3] Hao's 'semiotic entity' is her rebranding of Halliday's 'discrete semiotic abstraction' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 193-4). Hao was Martin's student and learnt her theorising from him.

[4] To be clear, this example of the authors' "tenor" is their rebranding of the grammatical relation between post-Deictic and Thing in nominal group structure: