The Problem With The Notion Of Purview

Doran, Martin & Zappavigna (2025: 23):

In Chapter 3 we will describe the difference between the genuine question of ‘What are you on about Jodie’ and the rhetorical question of ‘and did I get to go’ in terms of a difference in purview that Jodie and her mother have over the knowledge. In the genuine question, Jodie’s mother gives purview over the knowledge about what Jodie’s talking about to Jodie and thus allows her to answer as she pleases. But in the rhetorical question, Jodie makes clear that she expects both of them to know the answer to the question – that is, they both have purview over the knowledge. When positioned in this way, Jodie’s mother cannot really give an answer other than the one that is expected, because Jodie has positioned them both to agree. In Chapter 3, we will illustrate that we are regularly nuancing purview in this way to help position others to respond in particular ways. We will show that it is a rich resource for enacting social relations in terms of nuancing interpersonal control and responsibility.

Reviewer Comments:

Again, moves in an exchange realise the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and so are interpersonal potential at the level of semantics, not at the level of context (tenor).

Again, in interpreting the meanings of the exchange in terms of the knowledge of the interlocutors, the authors have adopted a cognitive perspective on language. However, this is inconsistent with SFL, the theory the authors are concerned with expanding. To be clear, in taking a 'language-based approach to cognition', SFL models 'knowledge' as meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: ix-x):

It seems to us that our dialogue is relevant to current debates in cognitive science. In one sense, we are offering it as an alternative to mainstream currents in this area, since we are saying that cognition "is" (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the "mental" map is in fact a semiotic map, and "cognition" is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as a linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes.

To be clear, the intellectual source of the authors' 'purview' is the work on 'epistemic authority' in social psychology, as formulated by the sociologists John Heritage and Geoffrey Raymond, in their paper The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction (Social Psychology Quarterly 2005, Vol. 68, No. 1, 15-38). The term 'purview' serves the social function of a buzzword.